Abstract In this paper we propose a dynamic Stackelberg game-theoretic model for urban freight transportation planning which is able to characterize the interaction between freight and personal transportation in an urban area. The problem is formulated as a bi-level dynamic mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC) which belongs to a class of computationally challenging problems. The lower level is dynamic user equilibrium (DUE) with inhomogeneous traffic that characterizes traffic assignment of personal transportation given the schedule of freight transportation. The upper level is a system optimum (SO) freight transportation planning problem which aims at minimizing the total cost to a truck company. A mathematical program with complementarity constraints (MPCC) reformulation is derived and a projected gradient algorithm is designed to solve this computationally challenging problem. Numerical experiments are conducted to show that when planning freight transportation the background traffic is nonnegligible, even though the amount of trucks compared to other vehicles traveling on the same network is relatively small. What's more, in our proposed bi-level model for urban freight transportation planning, we find a dynamic case of a Braess-like Paradox which can provide managerial insights to a metropolitan planning organization (MPO) in increasing social welfare by restricting freight movement.
INTRODUCTION

DYNAMIC STACKELBERG GAME-THEORETIC MODELING
In this study, we consider two types of traffic: freight transportation by trucks and personal transportation by private vehicles. Note that public transportation by buses is ignored in this model since its travel behavior (departure time and route choice) is almost fixed and independent of the behaviors of other vehicles. So in this paper, by personal transportation, we refer to private vehicles only. Trucks are controlled by a truck company who aims at minimizing the total transportation cost/delay while satisfying the travel demand (i.e., the total number of trucks required to travel between each origin-destination (O-D) pair to transport freight). Each private vehicle is driven by an individual road user who wants to minimize the personal travel cost/delay in the same time horizon. Thus, the two types of traffic compete for the limited road capacity. Since the individual road users do not cooperate, the impact of each private vehicle's travel behavior on the network traffic is not comparable to that of the truck company. So we model the problem as a Stackelberg game where the truck company is the leader and the other individual road users are the followers. We assume that private vehicles' travel behaviors follow dynamic user equilibrium given those of the trucks. This assumption may not hold for a single-day dynamic traffic assignment problem since it takes time to reach traffic equilibrium. However, we argue that the assumption is acceptable for a truck company that aims at making an optimal everyday transportation schedule in a long time horizon, especially when the travel demands are steady over time.
To understand the interaction of the two types of traffic in the Stackelberg game, we need to address the following questions: 1) How do the trucks' travel behaviors affect the private vehicles? 2) Considering the potential reactions of private vehicles towards its decision, how should the truck company schedule its freight transportation? In the remainder of this section, Section 3.1 and 3.2 answer the former question and Section 3.3 addresses the latter one.
Dynamic User Equilibrium with Inhomogeneous Traffic
We denote the time interval of interest by 1 0 , f t t + ⎡ ⎤⊂ ℜ ⎣ ⎦ . We assume that for all travelers (trucks and private vehicles) there is an identical desired time to arrive at their destinations, A T . Note that this assumption can be relaxed by allowing different desired arrival time and we can just classify travelers with the same desired arrival time into the same group and model each group explicitly in the DUE which, although complicating the problem formulation, does not change the analysis and structure of the solution approach. To distinguish parameters and variables for trucks from those for private vehicles, we adopt superscript "tr" and "pr", respectively.
The unit cost to each traveler on a specific path is denoted by the effective unit path delay operator
pr tr p t h h Ψ , which is defined by the addition of travel cost and penalty cost: 
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For simplicity, in this paper we assume a quadratic penalty function [ ]
where α is a constant.
To satisfy the travel demand for all private vehicles, the following flow conservation law must hold: 
Proof. See Friesz et al. (1993) . □ Let's denote this equilibrium by
Theorem 2.
( )
is equivalent to the following differential variational inequality (DVI): 
Link Delay Model Based Dynamic Network Loading with Inhomogeneous Traffic
Dynamic network loading (DNL) refers to "the determination of arc-specific volumes, arc-specific exit rates and experienced path delay when departure rates are known for each path" (Friesz et al. 2011 
By applying the chain rule, we can derive the following flow propagation constraints based on the above exit time functions (see Friesz et al. (2001) for more details): 
where as defined earlier ( ) 
⎦ , the flow propagation constraints can be approximated by ( ) there exists a unique solution to (2) and (3).
Proof. Per Walter (1988) , a unique solution to (2) and (3) exists if the right-hand side of each differential equation in (2) and (3) is continuously differentiable with respect to , , 
It is not difficult to derive the following closed-form expressions for derivatives of 
It was first proven by Friesz et al. (1993) that a closed-form formulation of DUE can preserve first-infirst-out (FIFO) rule under mild assumptions. In the remaining of this section, we prove a similar result for DUE with inhomogeneous traffic.
First we need to introduce the following lemma.
Lemma 1. If function :
f ℜ → ℜ is invertible and differentiable with a derivative f ′ :
Proof. See Friesz et al. (1993) . Now we can demonstrate the following theorem. The second and third equalities are derived using Lemma 1 and equation (i) 
Formulation of the Stackelberg Game
In the proposed Stackelberg game, the leader (the truck company) aims at minimizing its total cost while satisfying the travel demand over the time frame of interest, which can be represented by (4) and (5), respectively:
( )
By substituting (7) for (4), we have finalized the urban freight transportation planning problem as a single-level nonlinear program {(2), (3), (5), (6), (7)}. We design the following projected gradient algorithm to solve this nonlinear program.
Projected gradient algorithm:
Step 
We assume that in We can see that in all of these 4 scenarios, traffic flows exist only when the effective delay is at its minimum and the peak of the private vehicle flows occurs at around time 140 which can be considered as the appropriate departure time for private vehicles in order to arrive at the destination at the desired time a T . From Figure 2 , we can clearly identify the interaction of freight and personal transportation. As an example, in Scenario 3 (Figure 2(c) ) when there are in total 500 trucks traveling on the network, the private vehicle flow significantly differs from that in Scenario 4 (Figure 2(d) ) when there is no truck at all. What's more, again in Scenario 3, the peak of private vehicle flow occurs earlier that in Scenario 4. It is not intuitive why the traffic flow pattern in Scenario 3 significantly differs from those in Scenario 1 and 2. However, since the truck company optimizes its transportation cost over the entire network and Figure 2 just illustrates traffic flow pattern on one of the 25 paths of the network, such a result is not surprising.
Comparative Study
By Figure 2 , we have demonstrated that there exist interactions between truck and private vehicles even when the number of trucks is relatively small. We would like to further estimate the importance of considering such an interaction in truck scheduling by considering two cases. In Case 1, the truck company ignores the interaction and it simply assumes that the private vehicles will follow DUE without taking into account the truck flows. It estimates the effective delay operator under the regular DUE and uses it as the cost coefficient to optimize truck flows. Let's mark the optimal solution in this case as ( ) tr p h .
However, as we know, the truck flow will influence the private vehicle flow so that given ( ) tr p h , the real DUE flow for private vehicles is different from its estimation and thus the real effective delay operator is not the same as estimated. Thus in Case 1, the real total cost should be calculated using the real effective
delay operator. Let's mark the real total cost as z 0 . In Case 2, the truck company considers the interaction while optimizing truck flow and the optimal solution will be exactly the solution to the MPCC {(2), (3), (5), (6), (7)}. In Case 2, the minimal total cost is also the real total cost and let's mark it as z 1 . We then compare z 0 and z 1 in Scenario 1, 2 and 3 in Table 1 which shows that in all 3 scenarios considering the interaction can help reduce the total cost to the truck company significantly, especially when freight transportation accounts for a considerable portion of total traffic. The computation time is summarized in Table 2 and it is not surprising that in Case 2 the computation time in each scenario is much greater than its counterpart in Case 1 since in Case 1 the original problem is just single-level optimization thus does not involve iterative updates of DUE for private vehicles. However, considering the significant reduction in cost, it is still worth incorporating the interaction of freight and personal transportation for the truck company while making truck schedules. 
Braess-Like Paradox in Dynamic Stackelberg Game
So far in this paper, we have demonstrated that the interaction of freight and personal transportation should be considered when a truck company schedules its freight transportation in order to save cost. In this subsection, we want to address the concern of a MPO whose objective is to minimize total social cost, the cost to the all owners of private vehicles and the truck company, while ensuring that the travel demand is satisfied. A possible approach is to make a policy to restrict trucks from entering a portion of the network. However, it is not necessarily reducing the total cost since the transportation cost to the truck company may soar. So if it works, we actually come across a Braess-like Paradox: reducing capacity of a network for partial road users who selfishly select their routes can increase overall performance (see Akamatsu and Heydecker (2003) and Lin and Lo (2009) for more details about the dynamic extension of Braess Paradox). Note that since the MPO knows exactly that the truck company and the owners of private vehicles play a Stackelberg game, the problem is actually a tri-level optimization problem. To simplify the formulation and solution of the problem, we explore the existence of such Braess-like paradoxes by a trial-and-error approach. We arbitrarily choose one arc at a time from the network to be blocked for trucks. Then we conduct numerical test to check whether blocking that arc for trucks can reduce the total cost: if yes, then we find the Braess-like paradox and we can stop; if no, we choose another arc and repeat the numerical test and the judgment of result. After several iterations, we find that blocking all the trucks from entering Arc 12 during the time interval of our interest can reduce the total cost (see Figure 3 ). More details of this policy are summarized in Table 3 . From Table 3 , we know that the MPO can block trucks from entering Arc 12 to reduce total cost by 1.6%. However, it may increase the truck company's cost by 11.1%. So before the MPO implement such a policy, it should consider the possible obstruction from the truck company and try to balance the increase in social welfare and the loss in the truck company's profit. As an example resolution, the MPO may compensate the truck company for restricting its travel right.
CONCLUSION
In this paper we model urban freight transportation planning by a dynamic Stackelberg game and formulate the problem as a dynamic MPEC. In particular, we assume that there is a truck company trying to minimize its freight transportation cost which is dependent on its transportation plan and the background traffic such as personal transportation. The model explicitly characterizes the interaction of freight and personal transportation by its lower level problem, that is, DUE with inhomogeneous traffic, and optimizes the truck schedule in the upper level which is an SO problem. To obtain local optimal solutions and achieve efficient computation, we reformulate the MPEC as a MPCC and design a projected gradient algorithm to solve it. Numerical results show that the interaction between different road usersspecifically, a trucking company and individuals, exists and is nonnegligible even when the amount of trucks compared to that of private vehicles is small, and demonstrate that significant cost reduction can be achieved if the truck company schedules freight transportation considering this interaction, which supports our concern that in an urban network personal transportation should not be ignored while scheduling freight transportation. Moreover, with extensive numerical tests we find a Braess-like paradox in this dynamic bi-level transportation planning problem which implicates that a MPO may increase social welfare by restricting trucks from entering specific sections of the network during peak hours of a day. At the same time, since the restriction may significantly increase the truck company's cost, the MPO could compensate the truck company in order to smooth the implementation of the restriction.
Some interesting extensions of this study include but not limited to the following: (1) comprehensively investigate the dynamic Braess-like paradox based on the proposed modeling framework and discuss the necessary and sufficient conditions for the paradox to occur; (2) robustify the problem by incorporating uncertain travel demand; (3) model the upper level problem as service network design problem which is more realistic yet more challenging; (4) assume that there exist multiple truck companies competing with each other and study the resulting equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints (EPEC).
